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WHEN IS UNIFORMITY OF PEOPLE, NOT COUNTIES, APPROPRIATE 
IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION?  
THE CASES OF EARLY AND SUNDAY VOTING 
 
RICHARD L. HASEN* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Almost a decade and a half since the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decision in Bush v. Gore,1 no one knows what the case’s Equal Protection principle 
means or if it exists at all. As scholars2 and lower courts3 hotly debate the scope of 
the case that ended the disputed 2000 presidential election, the Supreme Court itself 
has remained silent. The case garnered a mere single mention at the Court in a 2013 
concurring opinion signed only by Justice Thomas which did not consider Equal 
Protection issues.4 
Republican George W. Bush was slightly ahead of Democrat Al Gore in the 
initial Florida vote count, the state whose Electoral College votes would determine 
the United States’ forty-third President.5 Gore demanded a series of ballot recounts, 
some of which narrowed the lead to a little over 500 votes. He then requested a 
recount of “undervoted” ballots (ballots not recording a vote for president) in four 
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to 
participants at the 2014 University of Chicago Legal Forum and to David Kimball for useful 
comments and suggestions and to participants in the 2014 APSA panel on the Presidential 
Commission on Election Administration whose discussion inspired this paper. 
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
2 For some of the scholarly commentary on equal protection principles, see Edward B. Foley, Voting 
Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836 (2013); Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 
Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1865 (2013) [hereafter, Hasen, 2012 Voting Wars]; Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 
68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 991–98 (2007); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1026–27 (2007); Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts: On Judicial 
Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1068–72 (2007); Nelson Lund, The 
Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219, 1263–65 (2002); Richard L. 
Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
377, 386–87 (2001) [hereafter Hasen, Future of Equal Protection]. 
3 See Hasen, 2012 Voting Wars, supra note 2; Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. 
Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9–15 (2007). 
4 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2268 n. 2 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
5 A full account of the 2000 Florida dispute, from which my account in the next two paragraphs 
below draws, appears in Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars, 41–73 (2012).  
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heavily Democratic Florida counties. Many Florida voters voted using unreliable 
“punch card” ballots, and vote totals depended upon election officials judging a 
voter’s intent by examining punched-out holes (or chad) in ballot cards. The Florida 
Supreme Court ordered a recount of undervoted ballots across all Florida counties. 
Bush went to the U.S. Supreme Court to stop further recounting. 
 Attorneys for Bush put forward an expansive understanding of equal 
protection principles. They argued against the ability of officials and courts to 
include in vote totals recounted ballots in which the recounts were conducted or 
would be conducted using inconsistent standards both within and between counties 
for what counted as a valid vote. The Court had never before applied equal 
protection principles to the “nuts and bolts” of elections. Attorneys for Gore argued 
for a narrow application of equal protection principles. The Supreme Court sided 
with Bush, holding that the conducting of a recount with inconsistent standards 
across and within counties violated the Equal Protection Clause.6 
The jurisprudential positions of the parties in the original Bush v. Gore case 
were somewhat odd given their usual political commitments. Republicans usually 
argue in election cases for narrow equal protection rules and Democrats for broad 
ones. For example, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,7 the 2008 
challenge to Indiana’s voter identification law, Democrats argued for a muscular 
reading of the equal protection clause to block laws requiring a voter to provide 
certain kinds of photographic identification to be eligible to cast a ballot, 
contending that such laws discriminated against the poor and others who were 
unlikely to have the right form of identification.8 Republicans, in contrast, argued 
for a narrower reading of equal protection principles, which would allow states to 
require photo identification to be used.9 In that challenge, the Supreme Court 
agreed with the narrower reading of equal protection Republicans favored. 
Despite the apparent tension between jurisprudence and politics, in the 
decade and a half since Bush v. Gore, Republicans have stuck with their Bush v. 
Gore-type broader call for uniformity in election administration rules across a state. 
For example, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, a Republican, has consistently 
insisted upon uniform hours for early voting in the State of Ohio, citing equal 
protection grounds. Reacting to a 2014 ruling challenging his ability to set uniform 
voting rules, Husted declared, “My overarching principle for Ohio’s long-debated 
voting schedule is that all voters, no matter where they live, should have the same 
6 See Hasen, Future of Equal Protection, supra note 2 (describing Bush v. Gore as the first case to 
address Equal Protection issues in the “nuts and bolts” of elections). 
7 Crawford v. Marion Cnty Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
8 Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner at 49-63, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 
(2008). 
9 Initial Brief: Appellee-Respondent at 21-29, Crawford v. Marion Cnty Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 
(2008). 
  
                                                                                                    




opportunity to vote. That’s why I have set uniform voting hours for all 88 counties 
and why I sent absentee ballot applications to voters statewide, so there would be 
no disparity in access.”10 
Georgia governor Nathan Deal, also a Republican, similarly argued for 
uniformity in voting days and rejected the proposition that different counties in 
Georgia should be allowed to decide whether or not to have Sunday voting in the 
early voting period before Election Day. He said that Sunday voting is “certainly 
the departure from the norm. And it apparently has a partisan purpose behind — at 
least they admit it has a partisan purpose behind it of trying to increase the 
Democratic turnout.” He added: “I don’t think anything that has to do with elections 
should be tilted one way or the other for partisan purposes.”11 
At a 2014 panel at the American Political Science Association, prominent 
Republican attorney (and former Romney for President general counsel) Ben 
Ginsberg objected when political scientist David Kimball called for local 
jurisdictions to have more flexibility in voting hours and locations for early voting. 
Ginsberg saw this as a “partisan” view of election administration and objected, 
arguing that early voting hours need to be uniform across all jurisdictions in a 
state.12 
Yet there is a fundamental flaw in the blanket calls for uniformity across 
counties (or electoral jurisdictions) in the name of equal protection principles from 
Bush v. Gore: uniformity across counties sometimes undermines the Equal 
Protection rights of voters because counties have different size populations. In this 
short Essay, I argue that election administration rules premised on uniformity of 
counties violate Bush v. Gore or other equal protection principles whenever a rule 
of election administration treats differently populated counties the same but the 
relevant rule significantly affects the level of services provided to individual voters.  
Indeed, even if Bush v. Gore ultimately has no precedential value (or no 
precedential value outside the narrow confines of a case involving statewide 
recounts of votes), uniform election law treatment across counties sometimes 
violates one person, one vote principles and is unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Using this analysis, I conclude that requirements of uniform 
early voting days and times across counties could well be unconstitutional, but a 
ban on Sunday voting would likely be constitutional so long as the number of hours 
offered to voters overall gives voters in different counties roughly the same 
10 Statement from Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted, Ohio Secretary of State, Sept. 4, 2014, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/mediaCenter/2014/2014-09-04-a.aspx, archived at, 
http://perma.cc/A6FV-LLYW. 
11 Greg Bluestein, Nathan Deal Says He’s No Fan of DeKalb’s Sunday Voting, POLITICAL INSIDER 
BLOG, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 10, 2014, http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2014/09/10/nathan-deal-
says-hes-no-fan-of-dekalbs-sunday-voting/, archived at, http://perma.cc/KX3X-3K52.  
12 Professor David C. Kimball, e-mail message to the author, Sept. 12, 2014 (recounting discussion 
at American Political Science Association meeting). 
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opportunities to vote. Challengers to a statewide ban on Sunday voting, or to 
leaving the choice discretionary to counties, would have to raise a different Equal 
Protection theory. 
 
II.  UNIFORMITY OF WHAT? 
 
Arguments that the time and dates of early voting should be uniform across 
a state have facial appeal. After all, if voters in Democratic urban areas have longer 
early voting hours than in other parts of the state, or if African-American voters 
(who overwhelmingly vote Democratic) are especially apt to take advantage of 
Sunday voting through “Souls to the Polls” events with buses going from church to 
voting, then extended hours or Sunday voting could appear to give Democrats an 
unfair advantage.13 Indeed, some Democrats suspect that the reason Republicans 
have pushed for uniformity in election administration across states is precisely to 
deprive Democrats of this advantage. Ohio State Senator Nina Turner, who later 
ran unsuccessfully for Secretary of State against Husted, said of Husted’s push for 
uniform voting days that “this is no more than uniform voter suppression, make no 
mistake about it.”14 Similarly, some Republicans suspect that the reason Democrats 
have argued against uniformity is to give Democrats partisan advantage, as 
evidenced by Georgia Governor Deal’s recent statements opposing Sunday voting 
in Democratic counties as having a “partisan purpose.”15 
Both of these sentiments could well be true. The parties’ positions on 
uniformity could well be partially (if subconsciously) motivated by the partisan 
consequences of the rules. This is inevitable in a system of election administration 
not conducted behind a veil of ignorance or at least by non-partisan election 
officials whose allegiance is to the integrity of the process and not to a political 
party. 
I want to step away from this partisan fight and concern over motivations, 
and instead examine the question of equal protection principles and uniformity. 
Consider two examples to flesh out how uniformity principles should apply in 
election administration decisions across counties: 
 
13 Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP v. Husted, No. 2:14-CV-404, 2014 WL 4377869, *33, *40 (S.D. 
Ohio Sept. 4, 2014) (describing “Souls to the Polls” in the context of a challenge under Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection clause); Florida v. U.S., 885 F. Supp. 2d 299, 335–
36 (D.D.C. 2012) (describing “Souls to the Polls” in context of Voting Rights Act section 5 
retrogression analysis). 
14 Adalia Woodbury, Ohio’s Former SOS Obliterates Husted’s Uniformity and Fairness Claim, 
POLITICUSUSA, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.politicususa.com/2012/08/24/husted-continues-block-
vote-ohio.html, archived at, http://perma.cc/VF8Z-VV48.  
15 Bluestein, supra note 11 (quoting Gov. Deal).  
  
                                                                                                    




1. In the name of uniformity, the chief election official of the state declares 
that each county in the state shall have the same number of voting machines. 
The largest county in the state has a population of about 10 million; the 
smallest county has a population of about 3,000.16 
 
2. In the name of uniformity, the chief election official of a state declares 
that each county in the state must follow the same standards for ballot 
format and typeface and follow the same rules for listing of candidates on 
the ballot. 
 
The two examples demonstrate that uniformity across counties sometimes 
is appropriate and sometimes is inappropriate and perhaps unconstitutional. In the 
first example, involving the number of voting machines, uniformity across counties 
would be manifestly inappropriate and almost certainly unconstitutional. The 
problem arises because a uniformity requirement as to the number of voting 
machines, unless the number is set ridiculously high, is likely to put much greater 
burdens on voters in large counties than in small ones. Requiring each county to 
have exactly 30 voting machines, for example, means that there would be one 
voting machine per 100 people in the smallest county, and one voting machine per 
333,333 people in the largest county. The obvious implication of such a dire 
disparity is that many voters in the larger counties would be effectively 
disenfranchised.17 Whether or not Bush v. Gore applies to the question of the voting 
machine per person disparity,18 such a severe burden on voting would likely be 
unconstitutional both under the line of cases subjecting severe burdens on voters to 
strict scrutiny (the so-called Anderson-Burdick line of cases),19 as well as under the 
16 This describes California in July 2013, according to Census Department figures. Los Angeles 
County has a population of 10,017,068; Sierra County has a population of 3,047. Annual Estimates 
of the Resident Population: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2013, U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, 
March 2014, available at http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml, archived at, 
http://perma.cc/5KUV-XA3V.  
17 See Christopher Famighetti, Amanda Melillo, & Myrna Perez, Election Day Long Lines: 
Resource Allocation, Brennan Center for Justice Report, Sept. 15, 2014, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ElectionDayLongLines-
ResourceAllocation.pdf, archived at, http://perma.cc/5UA7-RV9J (finding that voting machine 
distribution had a significant impact on voter waiting time); Charles Stewart III, Waiting to Vote in 
2012, 28 J. L. & POL. 439 (2013) (discussing how long wait times for voting can deter voters). 
18 For a discussion whether Bush v. Gore is violated when one county uses voting machines with 
much higher error rates than other counties in a statewide election in Hasen, Future of Equal 
Protection, supra note 2.  
19 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). On 
the Anderson-Burdick sliding scale balancing test, see Richard L. Hasen, Legislation, Statutory 
Interpretation & Election Law: Examples and Explanations, 262–63, 307–11 (2014); RICHARD L. 
HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES AND 
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one person, one vote cases, making it unconstitutional to more heavily weigh votes 
in some parts of a state rather than others.20 It cannot be that some voters would 
have only a small chance of being able to cast a ballot thanks to a lack of voting 
machines caused by a state edict requiring uniformity in the number of machines. 
In contrast, a rule requiring uniformity across counties in setting the 
standards for ballot formats and the listing of candidates on the ballot is 
unobjectionable and not even remotely unconstitutional. Indeed, such uniformity 
can promote fairness and sound election administration, reduce costs, and minimize 
voter confusion, such as when the state mandates clear ballot formatting which 
everyone will expect no matter where they vote in the state.21 No one in bigger or 
smaller counties is at an advantage or disadvantage under such rules.  
Both of the election officials’ orders require uniformity across counties, yet 
one is unconstitutional and the other is not only constitutional but commendable. 
What’s the difference? Some election administration choices, such as determining 
the proper number of voting machines, involve providing services to voters 
individually to facilitate the voting process. When the election administration rule 
significantly affects the level of services to voters, the uniformity principle should 
be tied to the number of voters and not the county unit. Thus, the proper way of 
proceeding with setting the number of voting machines is for election officials to 
base it upon the number of voters (e.g., one voting machine for every 3,000 voters 
in a jurisdiction) rather than upon the number of counties.  
Such a ruling is supported by Bush v. Gore itself. As the Court described it, 
the problem with the disparate rules for the counting and recounting of ballots by 
examining voting “punch cards” was one that existed not only between counties 
but within counties.22 Thus, the problem was inconsistency in the treatment of 
EXPLANATIONS 262–63, 307–11 (2014); Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, 
Gatekeeping v. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on 
the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 507 (2008).  
20 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); see also  
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (government may not 
discriminate among citizen, resident, adult non-felons’ enfranchisement in school board elections). 
21 Candidates in advance may prefer the random rotation of candidate names on the ballot across the 
state, so that no candidate gets a preferential ballot position. There is some dispute over how much 
the “ballot order effect” matters, but rotation eliminates any danger of such effect. R. Michael 
Alvarez, Betsy Sinclair, & Richard L. Hasen, How Much is Enough? The “Ballot Order” Effect and 
the Use of Social Science Evidence in Election Law Disputes, 5 ELECTION L.J. 40 (2006). 
22  
The want of [uniform recount] rules here has led to unequal evaluation of ballots in various 
respects. ….. As seems to have been acknowledged at oral argument, the standards for 
accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to county but 
indeed within a single county from one recount team to another. 
 
  
                                                                                                    




similar ballots across the state of Florida, and not simply differences from county 
to county. 
Other election administration choices, such as determining the format of the 
ballot, do not involve providing services to voters individually to facilitate the 
voting process. Instead, rules election administrators set in formatting ballots, 
dealing with internal processes, or conducting recounts are permissibly set 
uniformly across counties when appropriate.23 The proper way of deciding on 
proper ballot design and the listing of candidates depends in no way upon the 
number of voters in each county. 
For rules involving the provision of services to voters, like those setting the 
same number of voting machines across counties, imposing uniformity across 
counties with vastly different population sizes can cause greater burdens on voters 
in geographically larger counties. For rules which do not involve the provision of 
services to voters, like those setting uniform ballot typeface, the fact that a uniform 
state rule is administered through county election officials is happenstance, and the 
choice of uniform rule has no differential effect on voters across counties in a state.  
Further, electoral jurisdictions differ drastically in size and the populations 
they serve. As Kimball, Baybeck, and Deppen found, “Roughly 6 percent of the 
local jurisdictions served a bit more than two-thirds of the voters in the 2012 
election. Meanwhile, the thirty most populated jurisdictions serve more than 20 
percent of the nation’s voters. When casting their ballots, the vast majority of 
American voters are served by a very small number of heavily populated local 
jurisdictions.”24 
The record provides some examples. A monitor in Miami–Dade County testified at trial 
that he observed that three members of the county canvassing board applied different 
standards in defining a legal vote. And testimony at trial also revealed that at least one 
county changed its evaluative standards during the counting process. Palm Beach County, 
for example, began the process with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting completely 
attached chads, switched to a rule that considered a vote to be legal if any light could be 
seen through a chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of 
a per se rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal. This 
is not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment. 
 
Bush, 531 U.S. at 106–07 (citations omitted). 
23 Uniform recount rules would not be appropriate if jurisdictions used different voting technology 
for casting ballots. For example, if some counties use DRE (electronic) voting machines and other 
counties use optically scanned ballots filled in with pencils, the rules for recounts will necessarily 
be different. Courts have thus far rejected arguments that it is an equal protection violation to use 
DRE machines in some counties which, because of the nature of the technology, are not subject to 
ordinary recount rules. Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2006). 
24 David C. Kimball, Brady Baybeck, & Ray Deppen, Under the Radar: State Associations and 
Election Administration, Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Midwest 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Apr. 4, 2014 (on file with the author). 
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Uniformity often makes sense when the rules do not depend upon the level 
of services provided to voters. In contrast, uniformity across counties that 
significantly affects the level of services provided to voters is constitutionally 
suspect.  
 
III.  UNIFORM EARLY VOTING DAYS AND HOURS V.  
UNIFORM BAN ON SUNDAY VOTING 
 
Early voting hours appear to fit into the first category of cases, involving 
provision of services to voters. Just like the number of voting machines should be 
calibrated not to the number of counties but to the number of voters per voting 
machine, the number of hours or days of early voting should not be uniform across 
counties but should instead be tied to the capacity of polling places to accommodate 
voters in the jurisdiction. For example, if a state election administrator adopted the 
Presidential Commission on Election Administration recommendation that voters 
should have to wait no more than 30 minutes to vote,25 and if the administrator 
applied that recommendation to early voting throughout the state, election officials 
in large counties might need to schedule many more hours of early voting to handle 
capacity and meet this benchmark than election administrators in sparsely 
populated counties. 
Thus, while Ohio Secretary of State Husted’s insistence on uniformity in 
early voting days and hours at first looks defensible under Equal Protection 
principles, in fact it can undermine election administration principles if it places 
significantly greater burdens on voters in larger counties than in smaller counties. 
Perhaps for this reason, a federal district court in 2014 ordered Husted to allow 
counties to add additional early voting hours.26 
Other early voting practices enacted in the name of uniformity may raise 
similar issues. If the state requires that counties offer only one polling place for 
early voting per county, then the location of the polling place could have disparate 
25 The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission 
on Election Administration, Presidential Commission on Election Administration, Jan. 2014 at 14, 
https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf, 
archived at, http://perma.cc/8AXC-94LU (“The Commission has determined that, as a general rule, 
no voter should have to wait more than half an hour to have an opportunity to vote”) (emphasis 
omitted).   
26 Jackie Borchardt, Early Voting Schedule Expanded by Secretary of State Jon Husted While Court 
Decision Under Appeal, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER Sept. 15, 2014, 
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/09/early_voting_schedule_expanded.html, 
http://perma.cc/U3X3-LWUF (“The judge’s order also prohibits Husted from preventing local 
boards from setting hours in addition to the statewide schedule. Husted appealed the decision 
because he said it is inconsistent with the judge’s past decisions, which stated that Ohio could not 
treat one group of voters differently from another.”). 
  
                                                                                                    




affects across voters in a geographically dispersed county. Further, a single polling 
location could mean much longer lines for early voting in high population counties 
than in small population counties, much like the voting machine hypothetical 
mentioned earlier. 
As a constitutional matter, the difference must be significant enough 
substantively to warrant court intervention. We cannot have courts policing all 
minor deviations in voting conditions because this will clog up the courts without 
providing significant benefits to voters. If rural voters generally wait no more than 
5 minutes to vote and urban voters wait 20 minutes to vote, courts should not find 
a violation even though urban voters wait four times as long as rural voters. 
Similarly, in Ohio, 28 days of early voting is quite generous, and perhaps the 
uniformity rule applied there would not be unconstitutional because it did not 
significantly limit the voting opportunities for voters in more populated areas. 
Courts will have to use common sense to separate the line between de minimis costs 
and more onerous ones. 
The ban on Sunday voting question is more difficult. Like the early voting 
issue, the ban on Sunday voting involves the provision of services to voters. 
However, a ban on Sunday voting itself does not necessarily limit the total amount 
of services provided to voters. Under the principles I have set forth above, a ban on 
Sunday voting would be constitutional under the uniformity principle so long as the 
ban did not interfere with local election officials’ ability to otherwise set enough 
hours to comply with a benchmark in terms of voter waiting time.  
To argue that a ban on Sunday voting is unconstitutional requires a different 
type of equal protection argument, such as an argument that the ban constitutes an 
impermissible form of discrimination. Suppose urban areas contain poorer people 
who tend to work more hours, and who would have an easier time voting if 
jurisdictions held voting in these areas on Sundays. Further, suppose African-
American churches use “Souls to the Polls” campaigns to get African-American 
voters to the polls. Is a statewide ban on Sunday voting enacted in the name of 
uniformity constitutional and acceptable, even if it means that voters in the urban 
areas on average are inconvenienced more by the voting schedule than voters in 
other areas? 
Under these circumstances, if plaintiffs could show that state officials 
banned Sunday voting in the name of uniformity as a pretext for discriminating 
against African-American voters, such conduct is likely unconstitutional. Consider 
the views of Georgia State Senator Fran Millar, who lamented an increase in 
African-American voting thanks to Sunday voting days,27 and when pushed, 
27 Daniel Malloy, Jim Galloway, & Greg Bluestein, David Purdue is Back on the Air, Jean-Jacketed 
but Baby-less, POLITICAL INSIDER BLOG, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Sept. 9, 2014, 
http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2014/09/09/david-perdue-is-back-on-the-air-jean-jacketed-but-baby-
less/, archived at, http://perma.cc/X2XD-V8TA: 
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explained that he simply wanted “more educated voters” voting on Election Day.28 
Arguably these statements could lead a court to find racially discriminatory intent 
and hold the ban unconstitutional. 
Even without proof of racial discrimination, if election officials imposed a 
ban on Sunday voting and had no sound election administration reasons (and 
perhaps solely partisan reasons) for doing so, it is possible a court applying 
expansive equal protection principles could find this to be a violation. Such a result 
could be accomplished through an expansion of the Anderson-Burdick principles 
(which imposes strict scrutiny only in the case of severe burdens on voters, and not  
for more minor burdens, such as a ban on Sunday voting) to require election 
administrators to maximize convenience of voters. Alternatively, a court might 
expand voting protections for the poor. Finally, a court might hold that once a state 
offers Sunday voting or other voting conveniences, it may not take those benefits 
away without good reason (a type of “non-retrogression” principle).29 These latter 
sets of arguments go well beyond my claim about uniformity and election 
administration and are beyond the scope of this Essay.30 
Although it may be constitutionally permissible for states to ban Sunday 
voting in the name of uniformity (at least if no other constitutional principle comes 
 
Now we are to have Sunday voting at South DeKalb Mall just prior to the election. Per Jim 
Galloway of the AJC, this location is dominated by African American shoppers and it is 
near several large African American mega churches such as New Birth Missionary Baptist. 
Galloway also points out the Democratic Party thinks this is a wonderful idea – what a 
surprise. I’m sure Michelle Nunn and Jason Carter are delighted with this blatantly partisan 
move in DeKalb. 
 
28 Hunter Schwartz, Georgia State Senator Upset Over Efforts in Increase Voter Turnout in Black, 
Democratic Area, GovBeat, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/10/georgia-state-senator-upset-over-
efforts-to-increase-black-voter-turnout-says-he-wants-more-educated-voters/, archived at, 
http://perma.cc/PGA7-D9BJ (“Later [he said] that he would ‘prefer more educated voters than a 
greater increase in the number of voters.’”). 
29 See Edward B. Foley, Ohio Early Voting Case: A Potential Precedent Setter, Election Law @ 
Moritz, Sept. 4, 2014, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=12851, archived at, 
http://perma.cc/AP37-GXD3 (discussing the potential expansion of the non-retrogression principle 
as it appeared to be applied in Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted).  
30 For an argument that courts should expand Equal Protection principles and not allow courts to 
impose more than minor burdens on voters without evidence of a sound election administration 
reason to do so, see Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? How Courts Should Think About Efforts to 
Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2014) (“When 
a legislature passes an election-administration law discriminating against a party’s voters or 
otherwise burdening voters, courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause to require the legislature to produce real and substantial evidence that it has good reason for 
burdening voters and that its means are closely connected to achieving those ends.”). 
 
  
                                                                                                    




into play) such a ban is not necessarily good policy. For those who believe voting 
should be as easy and convenient as possible, Sunday voting has much to commend 
it. Many people are not working and therefore have more flexible schedules (and a 
greater ability to wait in line to vote); parents can take children with them to vote, 
inculcating them with the value of voting; and the more people who can vote during 
the early voting period, including Sundays, the less likely it is that there will be 
bottlenecks and problems on Election Day. But for something to be good policy 
does not mean it is constitutionally mandated. 
 
IV.  WHEN IS COUNTY DISCRETION PERMISSIBLE IN SETTING EARLY 
AND SUNDAY VOTING? 
 
Suppose the state allows counties to decide whether to offer early or Sunday 
voting or not, and some counties offer early or Sunday voting while others do not. 
It might be that only urban counties with many poorer and Democratic voters offer 
early or Sunday voting and rural counties do not. Or perhaps only rural counties 
offer early or Sunday voting and urban counties with many poorer and Democratic 
voters do not.  
The principles I have set forth so far do not directly answer the question 
whether such discretion may violate the Equal Protection Clause. I have only set 
forth the circumstances in which it may be an equal protection violation for a state 
to mandate uniformity in election administration: a state may not mandate 
uniformity across counties when the question significantly affects the level of 
services provided to each voter. In contrast, in the case of granting counties 
discretion to set rules, the state has allowed local variation on this question. Is such 
local discretion permissible? 
The constitutional answer is unclear. In Bush v. Gore, the Court suggested 
that variation in election rules to deal with local conditions is not an equal 
protection violation. The Court declared that “The question before the Court is not 
whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different 
systems for implementing elections. . . . Our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally 
presents many complexities.”31 Thus, even if Bush v. Gore has precedential value, 
it may not extend to decisions made in the exercise of local discretion. 
On the other hand, if county discretion leads to significantly greater 
opportunities to vote for voters in some counties rather than others, an equal 
protection claim seems plausible. If smaller counties have many more early hours 
31 Bush, 531 U.S. at 108. These sentences of course were controversial on the question whether the 
Court was seeking to deprive this case of any precedential value. See Chad Flanders, Bush v. Gore 
and the Uses of “Limiting”, 116 YALE L.J. 1159 (2007). 
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than the larger, then that could lead to just as much of a disparity as if the state set 
a uniform low cap for early voting hours. This would be a variation on the rule 
discussed above against mandatory uniform early voting hours. 
County discretion in Sunday voting seems less problematic from the point 
of view of voter opportunity, again so long as the Sunday voting decision of 
counties does not cause inconsistent treatment in voting opportunities in some 
counties rather than in others. 
Once again, any claims against county choice on Sunday voting would 
depend upon an expansion beyond Equal Protection uniformity principles. A 
decision to bar Sunday voting in a county motivated by racial animus would be 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Discrimination against the 
poor, against Democrats or Republicans, or a challenge based upon a theory of 
constitutionally-required convenience voting (such as no fault absentee voting or 
early voting) or non-retrogression all raise separate, non-uniformity Equal 
Protection issues.  
Even if courts expand Equal Protection doctrine and accept a theory of a 
right to convenience voting, it is not clear how to measure “convenience.” In Ohio, 
for example, Secretary of State Husted required county election jurisdictions to 
send absentee ballot applications to everyone in the state. Husted required this step 
in the name of uniformity after a few (mostly Democratic) counties were sending 
such ballot applications to county voters.32  
In a recent federal court case involving Ohio’s reduction in early voting 
days, the federal district court rejected the argument that Ohio’s practice of sending 
absentee ballot applications to all Ohio voters was an adequate substitute for 
expanded early voting. The court found that many African-Americans did not trust 
the absentee balloting mechanism, preferring to vote in person.33 The court ruled 
32 See supra note 10; Secretary of State Husted Announces Details for 2014 Statewide Absentee 
Ballot Mailing, Ohio Secretary of State, Aug. 20, 2014, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/mediaCenter/2014/2014-08-20.aspx, archived at, 
http://perma.cc/HA8T-QV7T (“In past elections, only a few boards of elections sent absentee ballot 
applications to voters in their counties. This led to a disparity in access and opportunity from county 
to county, which Secretary Husted has worked to address whether the voter chooses to vote early 
by mail or in person. [¶] Our commitment to treating all voters fair and equally, regardless of where 
a person lives in the state, gives every Ohioan the same access to the ballot.”). 
33 Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP, 2014 WL 4377869, *35. Among the court’s factual findings on 
vote-by-mail: 
• Some voters do not trust voting by mail. 
• “Some [voters] take pride in going to the booth and pulling the lever” and “for some, as 
in the African–American community, [voting] is a cultural tradition because it is a right 
that was fought hard for and they want to experience it in person.”  
• According to Davis, Senate Bill 205 prohibits prepaid postage for ballots and requires all 
fields on the ballot envelope to be completed. 
  
                                                                                                    




that the reduction from 35 to 28 days of early voting, which included eliminating a 
Sunday “Souls to the Polls” day and the “Golden Week” in which voters can both 
register to vote and cast an early ballot at the same time, violated both the Equal 
Protection Clause and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.34 
 One of the district court’s theories for preventing the moderate contraction 
of early voting appears to be that voting must be greatly convenient to minority 
voters in order for a state to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a 
decision which if upheld could open up a whole new array of voting rights claims.35 
The Court also seemed to adopt a non-retrogression theory of early voting: once a 
jurisdiction offers days of early voting, they cannot be taken away.36 It is not clear 
how to square such a theory with the Equal Protection rights of voters in states, 
such as New York, which offers no early voting at all and uniform polling hours 
throughout busy and less busy counties in New York.37 
If they stand, these theories go well beyond the uniformity question, and 
could take Voting Rights Act and constitutional Equal Protection claims in wholly 
new directions. My proposed understanding of the uniformity principle does not 
require courts to go this far. It only requires courts to recognize that election 
administration rules premised on uniformity of counties violate equal protection 
• According to Fairchild, “[m]any of the people from lower-income backgrounds that I've 
worked with do not trust voting by mail. Even organizers do not encourage it because it is 
a multi-step process where you must find postage, mail-in an absentee ballot request, then 
find postage again, and mail in the absentee ballot. Lower-income people with less 
educational attainment are often living chaotic lives and are often unable to understand this 
process.” 
• According to Braxton, “‘Vote–by–Mail’ is not a sufficient alternative to [early in person] 
voting. First, most of the people I interact with regularly do not even pay their bills by mail 
anymore, so many people overlook traditional mail as a means to cast their vote since it is 
not a traditional medium for voting. And, second, minority communities I have worked 
with distrust the vote-by-mail system and want to see their ballots actually processed.”  
Id. at 16 (citations omitted). 
34 Id. at 43–44. After the Sixth Circuit refused to stay the order restoring days of early voting, the 
Supreme Court, without issuing an opinion, stayed that order. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP, 2014 
WL 4377869 (granting preliminary injunction), stay denied pending appeal, 769 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 
2014), aff’d on merits, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014), stay granted sub. nom, Husted v. Ohio State 
Conf. of NAACP, 135 S.Ct. 42 (2014). On the Supreme Court’s silence in this order and related 
orders issued in the weeks before the November 2014 elections, see Richard L. Hasen, Reining in 
the Purcell Principle, ___ FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), draft available, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545676. 
35 Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 2014 WL 4377869 at 38–39. 
36 Id. 
37 Rick Hasen, Breaking News and Analysis: Federal Court Grants Injunction Restoring Early 
Voting in Ohio, ELECTION LAW BLOG, Sept. 4, 2014, http://electionlawblog.org/?p=64964, archived 
at, http://perma.cc/23WX-9RS3 (comparing cutback in early voting in Ohio with the lack of any 
early voting in New York). 
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principles whenever the rule treats differently populated counties the same but the  
rule significantly affects the level of services provided to individual voters.  
 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Who could be against uniformity in election administration? The question 
turns out to be more complicated than it first appears. Bush v. Gore, if it means 
anything, indicates that sometimes lack of uniformity in election administration 
across counties raises Equal Protection issues.  
Uniformity in election administration often makes sense to reduce 
confusion, enhance efficiency, and assure fairness of the electoral process. But a 
problem also sometimes arises when election administrators mandate uniformity 
across counties, not people. In Jenness v. Fortson,38 the Supreme Court observed 
that “[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are 
different as though they were exactly alike.”39 When the election administration 
rule significantly affects the level of services to voters, the equality principle should 
be tied to the number of voters and not the county unit. Otherwise the laws treat 
voters in very differently populated counties as though they were exactly alike. 
Large counties, especially in urban areas with many new and moving voters, 
face big election administration challenges that are different from challenges faced 
by counties with small, relatively unchanging populations. When state election 
administrators treat large and small counties uniformly, we need to ask whether 
uniformity across counties creates Equal Protection problems for voters. When 
uniformity creates these problems, it is appropriate for courts to intervene.  
38 403 U.S. 431 (1971). 
39 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). 
  
                                                                                                    
